Reprinted from National Journal
Egyptian
President Mohamed Morsi and his Islamist brethren next door, the Palestinian
leaders of Hamas, have made errors of political judgment in recent weeks that
were as serious as anything we’ve seen since,
well, Mitt Romney discovered how badly he’d misread the American
electorate a month ago.
The
common mistake made by Morsi and Hamas was to fail to understand the political
mood around them. Both thought they had more support than actually existed to
pursue radical agendas. Morsi issued an astonishing edict assuming
near-absolute powers (though he claimed it was only temporary) and declaring
his right to legislate without judicial
oversight, only to
find he faced street protests almost as angry as the ones that took down Hosni
Mubarak two years ago. Hamas launched rocket attacks thinking the Israelis
would hesitate to respond with a sympathetic Islamist government in Egypt, and
post-Arab Spring jihadists rising around the region. Instead, Israel responded
with a fierce air assault, assassinated Hamas’ military chief, Ahmed Jabari,
and proved the efficacy of its “Iron Dome” missile defense system, creating a
powerful deterrent against future attacks.
The
question now is whether both Morsi and Hamas will learn from these mistakes. If
they do, and if the Obama administration plays its role of reluctant enforcer
well, then the entire future shape of the Mideast could look different.
U.S.
officials, and some Israelis, believe the fulcrum of the future is Morsi
himself. For now, he is the key figure both in setting the direction of
Egypt—whether as legitimate participatory democracy or retrograde
dictatorship—and in brokering a more enduring ceasefire between Hamas and
Israel that could portend a future of new hopes or new hostilities. As the
first elected Islamist head of state in Arab history, Morsi is the subject of an unprecedented experiment in whether radical jihadists in
power can adapt to the modern world. Will the
Muslim Brotherhood leave behind its unrealistic dreams of imposing sharia
religious law and learn to govern pragmatically, which means linking up Egypt’s
impoverished economy to the global system? Can an
Islamist head of state renounce jihadist violence in practice instead of
theory, in contrast to al-Qaida or its many offshoots, as well as Hamas and
Hezbollah? Can Morsi can work with the international community rather than
consistently defy it, like the Iranian regime?
In the
longer term lies the question of whether radical Islamists can begin to edge
ideologically toward what was once taboo: accepting the existence of Israel.
Morsi has already moved in this direction tacitly by pledging to President
Obama, who has some $1.5 billion in foreign aid and promises of debt relief as
leverage, that he will observe the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. Hamas, a Muslim
Brotherhood offspring, has consistently refused to acknowledge Israel’s right
to exist; that stance, along with the group’s continued sponsorship of
terrorist attacks, has resulted in a permanent standoff in which neither Israel
nor Hamas will negotiate with each other.
But even
some Israeli officials are hopeful that this ceasefire will have more impact
simply because Hamas is dealing with Morsi rather than Mubarak or another
secular Arab autocrat.
“There is a relationship there that should
mean much more to [Hamas] than if they made promise to Mubarak,” says a senior
Israeli official who spoke to National Journal on condition of anonymity. “So
to a certain extent it gives Israel more confidence that the ceasefire will
have longevity. Now there’s Israeli deterrence. That is an important factor.
And Hamas made a commitment, and we don’t think they want to burn their bridges
with Morsi.” It was no accident that after the Israeli counter-attack began
Hamas leader Khaled Meshal took refuge in Cairo and effusively praised Morsi –
the “dear, brave Egyptian president,” as he called him – over his role the
ceasefire.
Another
question is whether Hamas—and Morsi—have now taken on the responsibility for
reining in other Islamist groups that are even more radical, like Islamic
Jihad. One thing Hamas did achieve with its rocket assault was to further
marginalize the rival Palestinian Authority in the West Bank (though it was the
latter that led a bid for “non-member observer status,” a slight diplomatic
upgrade for the Palestinians, at the U.N. this week). At the same time,
however, Hamas is being forced to prove its legitimacy to its own people all
over again. The democratic revolution in the Arab world is an unpleasant
reminder to the Palestinians that Hamas effectively seized power in Gaza in
2006 despite getting only a plurality in the election.
And now
Hamas “has made a commitment to the Egyptians to keep everything quiet. What’s
going to happen down the line --it could be just weeks -- when under
inspiration from Iran, Islamic Jihad starts the second round? Will Hamas
restrain them?” says the Israeli official. “Hamas has a foot in the Iranian camp,
and a foot in with Morsi. Which way will Hamas go? … The jury is still out on
Morsi as well. He’s been playing his cards very carefully over the last three
months. But I have to tell you the way he behaved in this crisis gave us
confidence that things could be OK.”
Egypt,
in the person of Mohamed Morsi, has become once again the center of gravity in
the Middle East. The decisions he makes over the coming months could make all the difference
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